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The Three Legged Stool: Women
and Retirement (In)Security
By FRANCES LEONARD*
In the Fall of 1980, more than four hundred older women1 at-
tended the White House Mini-Conference on Older Women2 to
draft an agenda of their most critical concerns to be presented to
the delegates of the White House Conference on Aging in Decem-
ber, 1981. Almost ninety percent of those responding identified in-
come as one of the three most critical concerns facing older wo-
men; for over half, income was the most critical concern. This
concern is justified by an examination of the statistics regarding
the income levels of older women. According to the Census Bureau,
more than one-third of the unmarried women4 age sixty-five or
I
* B.A., 1961, Mills College; J.D., 1979, Golden Gate University School of Law. Member,
California Bar.
1. "Older woman" is a term of art. Feminist and older women's advocate Tish Som-
mers believes the term is subjective in that a woman is an "older woman" when she accepts
the description as applying to her or when she perceives that others are applying it to her.
Interview with Tish Sommers, President of the Older Women's League, in Oakland, Califor-
nia (Nov. 10, 1980). The Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) uses age 40 as the
threshold. See 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 1 1979). Old-age benefits under Social Security
begin at age 62, 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (1976), and aged Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
benefits begin at age 65, id. § 1381, yet mandatory retirement is prohibited until age 70, 29
U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. 1I 1979). This Article uses the term to describe women of retirement
age, the threshold of which is approximately age 50.
2. The conference was held October 9-10, 1980, at the Hotel Savory in Des Moines,
Iowa.
3. Respondents were asked to list by priority the three most critical issues faced by
older women. Out of 182 responses, 160 included income as one of their top three concerns
(88.9%), while 100 placed it as their first concern (54.9%). Health was the first priority for
26 (14.3%); housing was named first by six (3.3%). The raw data is available through the
Older Women's League, 3800 Harrison St., Oakland, CA 94611.
4. Statistical references throughout this Article pertain to unmarried older women.
Most of these unmarried older women are widows; one study estimates 7 out of 10 women
age 65 or over are or will become widows. PRsmarNT'S COMM'N ON PENSION POLICY, WORK-
ING PAPERS: WORKING WOMEN, MARRIAGE AND Rx MaMENT at xi (1980) [hereinafter cited as
WORKING PAPERS] (relying on estimate of Dr. James Weed, Statistician, National Center for
Health Statistics). By contrast, men who enter retirement years married tend to remain
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older are living below the poverty level;5 older women actually are
becoming the single poorest group in the United States.6
Retirement income policy planners speak of the "three legged
stool,"' 7 a metaphor that refers to the three components of an ade-
quately funded retirement: social security, pensions, and savings.
The American retirement system operates on the assumption that
all three legs will be in place. To the extent one or more legs is
short or missing, most individuals will not have an adequate retire-
ment income. Unfortunately for women, the three legs usually are
short or missing. Sixty percent of the unmarried older women (in-
cluding widows age sixty-five or older) rely on social security bene-
fits unsupplemented by a pension or savings." Only eighteen per-
cent receive additional income from pensions.
Public policy, as reflected in statutes and regulations, is to
some degree responsible for the income crisis that many older wo-
men face.10 The American retirement income system is controlled
married until death. Grad & Foster, Income of the Population Aged 55 and Older, 1976,
Social Security Bull., July 1979, at 17. Between the ages of 55 and 61, 12% of men are
unmarried, compared with 24% of women. Between the ages of 65 and 72, 13% of men are
unmarried, compared with 40% of women. Over age 73, 14% of men are single, compared
with 54% of women. Id.
5. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE
CHANGING ROLES OF MEN AND WOMEN app. C, at 178 (Table 13) (1979) [hereinafter cited as
HEW REPORT]. For people age 65 and over, the 1976 poverty level was $3445 for couples
and $2730 for single people. Id. at 167 (Table 1).
6. The White House Conference on Aging, Office of Public Affairs, Facts on Older
Women 2 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Facts on Older Women]. The poverty rate for older
women is 65% higher than it is for older men. Id.
7. "When social security was established, it was intended to provide a minimum floor
of retirement income. It was expected to be supplemented by other sources of retirement
income such as private pensions and personal savings. Together those sources were to pro-
vide an adequate retirement income. The~e three sources of retirement income generally are
referred to as the three-legged stool in the U.S. and as the three pillars of retirement income
in such countries as Switzerland and West Germany." PRESmENT'S COMM'N ON PENSION
POLICY, AN INTERIM REPORT 4 (May 1980) [hereinafter cited as INTERM REPORT].
8. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 183 (Table 16).
9. Id.
10. The role of public policy in the Social Security program has been under study by
some policymakers. See, e.g., Treatment of Women Under Social Security: Hearings
Before the Task Force on Social Security and Women of the Subcomm. on Retirement
Income and Employment and the Select Comm. on Aging of the House of Representatives,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); 125 CONG. Rc. E1068 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979) (remarks of
Rep. Schroeder). Congressional concern over the matter thus far has been expressed only in
hearings and failed legislative proposals. However, Congress has authorized two important
studies. Pursuant to § 706(d) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 907(d) (1976 & Supp.
11 1979), the 1979 Advisory Council on Social Security submitted its report to Congress in
December, 1979. See AnvisoRY COUNCIL ON SOCIAL SECURrrY, SOCIAL SECURTY FINANCING
1196 [Vol. 32
WOMEN AND RETIREMENT
substantially by statute. Pension plans in the private sector are
regulated by the comprehensive Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act"- (ERISA), while public sector pension funds are regu-
lated under both state and federal statutes.12 In addition, tax-shel-
tered retirement savings programs are federally regulated.18
Finally, the Social Security Act1 ' pervades the entire retirement
income field.
Although no more than forty-one percent of the elderly poor
would be expected to be unmarried women 5 if no bias were pre-
sent in the statutory system, the President's Commission on Pen-
sion Policy has reported that seventy-two percent of the elderly
poor are unmarried women."' The disproportionate number of re-
tirement age women below the poverty level must result from an
implicit discrimination in the statutory retirement income system,
which reflects a lack of concern for the factors of age and sex, or a
disregard for the value to society of unpaid work in the home.17
The consequence of the present system's failure to accommodate
the prevailing work patterns of the female population has been
that many women of retirement age are forced to seek aid from
I
AND BEmNarrs (1979). Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 341, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977), instructed the Depart-
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare to issue a report on social security and changes in
the roles of men and women. This report, HEW REPORT, supra note 5, was issued in 1979.
The Executive Branch also has begun to reexamine some of the policies reflected in the
.social security program. The President's Commission on Pension Policy was established in
September, 1978 by President Carter in Exec. Order No. 12,071, 3 C.F.R. 211 (1979), and
given congressional authorization in Pub. L. No. 96-14, 93 Stat. 29 (1979). The Commission
was charged with delivering its final report in February, 1981. The Commission issued in-
terim reports in May and November, 1980, see INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, and a working
paper has been issued on the topic of women. See WORKING PAPMRS, supra note 4.
11. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
12. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8348 (1976 & Supp. m 1979); CAL. Gov'T CODE §8
20,000-21,500 (West 1980).
13. See I.R.C. § 408.
14. 42 U.S.C. §8 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. MI 1979).
15. In 1977, of the total population aged 65 or older, there were 146 women to every
100 men. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Clearinghouse on Aging,
Facts About Older Americans 1978 (1979). It is projected that the disparity in this age
group will widen by the turn of the century to 150 women to every 100 men. Id. Women
thus currently constitute approximately 59% of the population age 65 or over; at most, 70%
of these women are unmarried. See note 4 supra.
16. INTEIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 28 (Chart IV).
17. As asked by one Congresswoman: "[D]oes society place enough value on the child-
bearing/homemaking role of women to shift some of the cost of this function off the woman
herself and on to the pension system?" ERISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on S.
209 Before the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resourcies, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1043
(1979) (statement of Representative Schroeder).
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need based public assistance programs.18 Furthermore, because wo-
men age sixty-five or older constitute the fastest growing segment
of the American population, the problem is becoming increasingly
significant;19 one out of four women working today can expect to
be poor in her old age.20
The major federal statutes that control the three legs of the
retirement income stool include a number of provisions that dis-
criminate against the female majority of the older population. Al-
though since Califano v. Goldfarb2' these laws have been substan-
tially free of gender distinctions, many "sex-neutral" provisions
continue to have a disparate impact on women that usually is not
felt until their retirement years. 22 Retirement income for women
thus is a problem related to both age and sex.
The devastating effects of discrimination based on both age
and sex further combine to deprive women of the benefits of the
pension and savings components of retirement income. Pensions
are designed to award the long-term, full-time, well-paid employee,
historically characteristics of the male work pattern.2 In addition,
18. In 1976, 15% of single older people reported receiving public assistance. AMRIcAN
CouNCIL OF LIFE INSURANCE, PENSION FACTS 1978-1979, at 45 (Table 20) (hereinafter cited as
PENSION FACTS]. Most of these are undoubtedly women, because women predominate among
unmarried elders. See note 4 supra.
19. See note 15 supra.
20. Facts on Older Women, supra note 6, at 2.
21. 430 U.S. 199, 217 (1977) (holding unconstitutional a Social Security Act provision
requiring widowers to prove dependency). One gender distinction retained in the Social Se-
curity Act is that all the community property income earned in a husband-wife business
partnership is credited entirely to the husband's account unless substantially all of the man-
agement and control of the business is in the hands of the wife. 42 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5)(A)
(1976).
22. The principle of dual-burden discrimination was recognized by the Fifth Circuit in
Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980). The plain-
tiff in Jeflries, a black woman, alleged that she was the victim of employment discrimina-
tion in being denied a promotion. The district court had considered the sex and race dis-
crimination claims separately. Because of the number of women employees, the district
court held there was no sex discrimination; based on the number of black employees and the
fact that a black male received the promotion, the district court also found that there had
been no race discrimination. The Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred in not con-
sidering the plaintiff's claim (and statistical evidence) of discrimination on the basis of both
race and sex, and declared that discrimination against black women can exist in the absence
of discrimination against white women or black males. Id. at 1032-35. This principle should
be extended to cases alleging both age and sex discrimination because separate statistical
showings of female employees and employees over the age of 40 are not likely to reveal
discrimination against women over 40.
23. THE CONORSSSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE OF THE LmRARY OF CONGRESS FOR THE Sun-
COMM. ON RETIREMENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT OF THE HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING,
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while Social Security covers ninety percent of the paid work force,
it does not cover homemakers, the largest occupational class of
all.24 Finally, tax-sheltered private savings for retirement are, as a
practical matter, unavailable to most homemakers. 25 The conver-
gence of these factors makes the retirement income stool a shaky
one for older women.
This Article attempts to illustrate how the aggregate effect of
the separate statutory schemes regulating the distribution of re-
tirement income results in a significant income disadvantage for
women of retirement age. The Article examines the features of the
major federal retirement income statutes, focusing on those factors
that result in single women having forty percent less retirement
income than single men.28 The Article also reviews the various pro-
posals for reform of each of the statutory systems.
The First Leg: Social Security
Despite its original purpose of merely supplementing private
pension income, 7 the social security system now provides the
foundation of the American retirement income system. Social se-
curity presently pays $120,000,000,000 a year to 35,000,000 peo-
ple,28 or one in every seven in the nation,2 9 and covers ninety per-
cent of the paid labor force. 0
Because of their greater longevity, women constitute approxi-
96TH CONG., 1ST SESS., WOMEN AND RETiREmNT INCom PROGRAMS: CURRENT ISSUES OF
EQurrY AND ADEQuAcY 4 (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited as CRS REPORT].
24. In 1978, 49.9% of American women were not in the paid labor force. Id. at 83
(Table 1) (source: U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, EMPLOYMENT AND
EARNINGS 155 (Table 2) (1979)).
25. For example, Individual Retirement Accounts (IRA's), see I.R.C. § 408, are availa-
ble only to those homemakers whose working husbands are themselves eligible for, and par-
ticipating in, an IRA. Id. See notes 237-44 & accompanying text infra.
26. In 1977, the median income of all older women was $3,087 per year, as compared
to $5,526 for all older men. Facts on Older Women, supra note 6, at 2.
27. See note 7 supra.
28. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 26.
29. Id. See also HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
30. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 26. The 10% of paid workers excluded from cover-
age primarily are federal civil servants, see 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(6)(A) (1976), state and local
governments who opt for noncoverage, id. § 418 (1976 & Supp. In 1979), and certain tax-
exempt organizations who elect to remain outside of the system, id. § 410(a)(8)(B) (1976).
The vast occupational class of homemakers also is excluded, but is not included in the 90%
coverage figure because of homemakers' unpaid status.
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mately sixty percent of the social security beneficiaries. 1 Rather
than serving its majority constituency equitably, however, the
amount of social security benefits received by the average woman
is much less than that received by the average man.32 While under-
lying sex discrimination in the paid labor force contributes to this
income gap,33 it is only part of the problem; also at fault are vari-
ous provisions in the Social Security Act 4 (Act) and in the regula-
tions promulgated under the Act.35 In general, the problems result
from Congress' lack of recognition of homemaking as an occupa-
tion, with the effect being felt by the homemaker when she
retires."
Social Security and the Retired Homemaker
The social security system, as presently structured, operates to
exclude many retired homemakers from participating in the sys-
tem by imposing the requirement that a worker remain in the paid
labor force for forty quarters (ten years) to qualify for fully insured
status.37 The effect of this restriction is disproportionately felt by
persons who combine a paid work career with time at home for
child rearing. Many of these persons do not meet the forty quarter
threshold,3 8 and as a consequence can receive social security bene-
fits only as dependents, being ineligible for the more lucrative
31. Of the 24,500,000 social security beneficiaries over the age of 62 in 1976, 14,400,000
were women. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
32. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 95 (Table 20) (source: DEP'T OF COMMERCE, Bu-
REAU OF CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORT No. 118). While the average yearly benefit
paid to men is $5,400, the average benefit paid to women is only $3,100 per year. Id.
33. Because Social Security is wage-based, lower paid workers receive lower retirement
income benefits. Because women's wages are, on the average, less than sixty percent of
men's, see CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 11, this disparity is reflected in retirement years
by the reduced social security benefit. The fact that almost two million women who were
entitled to their own primary account chose to receive dependent's benefits because they
were higher, see HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 4, illustrates the impact of low paid work
history on social security benefits.
34. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1976 & Supp. II 1979).
35. Social Security Administration regulations are found at 20 C.F.R. §§ 401-450.105
(1980).
36. Gender descriptions that assume homemaking is primarily a female occupation are
used throughout this Article for convenience.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (1976).
38. Of the 14,400,000 women receiving social security benefits in 1976, roughly 58%
received their benefits as dependents, approximately 3,400,000 as wives and approximately
5,000,000 as widows. Only 6,000,000 women received their benefits as retired workers. HEW
REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
[Vol 32
WOMEN AND RETIREMENT
worker benefits.se In addition, the payroll contributions made by
workers who do not attain forty quarters of coverage are never re-
covered either as retirement benefits or as a lump-sum return of
the contributions. 0
Furthermore, under the dual entitlement rule, which allows a
married homemaker with her own fully-insured status to receive
the greater of either her old-age benefits or one-half of her spouse's
benefits,41 many women who do achieve forty quarters of coverage
still find that, because of the original disparity in employment in-
come, fifty percent of their husband's benefits is greater than one
hundred percent of their own.42 By opting for spousal benefits,
these women must forfeit the payroll contributions they have
made."
Even if a retired homemaker has met the forty-quarter thresh-
old for eligibility, in calculating the amount of benefits for which
she is eligible, a homemaker's work is not only ignored by the so-
cial security system, it may lower the amount of benefits to which
39. The lifetime homemaker, with no paid work history, whose marriage remains in-
tact until her husband's retirement, is not affected by this official disregard of the home-
making occupation. While both are living, the couple will receive 150% of his Primary In-
surance Amount (PIA). Id. § 402(a)-(b)(2) (1976 & Supp. DI 1979). Upon the death of
either, the benefit is reduced to 100% of his PIA. Id. § 402(e)(2)(A), (f)(3)(A).
40. The statute makes no provision for the return of payroll contributions to one who
comes under the dual entitlement. See 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1)(D)-(c)(1)(C). The Act prohibits
a couple from making voluntary contributions on the homemaker's behalf as employment
compensation for her services in the home. Id. § 410(a)(3)(A) (1976).
41. Id. § 402(b)(1)(D), (c)(1)(C) (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979).
42. See note 33 supra. The tendency of the system to place heavy reliance on depen-
dency benefits for the unpaid homemaker is rooted in history. At the time the Social Secur-
ity Act was enacted, it was assumed that men worked, women stayed home, and marriage
lasted a lifetime. See HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 1-3. These assumptions, however, are
no longer true; one in three marriages ends in divorce, id. at 2, and 90% of American women
are in the paid labor force at some time in their lives. Id. at 2. The social security system
has failed to respond adequately to these changes.
43. Social Security is not based strictly upon insurance principles. Since its enactment
in 1935, there has been constant tension between social principles and insurance principles.
See generally Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate Minimum Income in Old Age: The
Erratic Partnership Between Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 CoRrNuL. L. Rv.
437 (1979). The notion that some contributors will receive more value for their payments
than others is reflected in many sections of the Act. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii)
(Supp. HI 1979) (relative amount of benefit varies with salary); id. § 429 (1976) (World War
II service personnel deemed to have paid into the system); id. § 431 (same for Japanese-
Americans interned at relocation centers during World War 11). Nonetheless, it seems mani-
festly unjust that workers whose predominant work patterns, imposed in part by societal
pressure, fall outside the Act should be additionally penalized by forfeiture of those
amounts they have contributed.
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she is entitled. Because social security benefits are wage-based,44
the amount of benefits a person is entitled to receive is calculated
with reference to his or her Average Indexed Monthly Earnings
(AIME)" over a thirty-five year period. In making this calculation,
a retiree is permitted to exclude only the five lowest earnings years
from the thirty-five year calculation. The practical effect of limit-
ing this exclusion to only five years of the wage earner's lowest
earning years is to lower the retirement income of older women
who have combined homemaking with paid employment. For ex-
ample, a woman who worked in the paid labor force for five years,
devoted fifteen years to raising a family, *and then returned to the
paid labor force for twenty years, will have to include ten "zero
earnings years" in her AIME calculation.
Other countries have acted to mitigate this result in their own
social security programs.4 The United Kingdom, for example,
credits women and men for up to twenty homemaking years if the
homemaking spouse is also caring for a child, or an aged, sick, or
disabled relative. 7 Switzerland credits all married women, widows,
and divorced women for their years of marriage, whether or not the
marriage produced children. 8
The system in the Federal Republic of Germany awards cred-
its towards the minimum needed to qualify to men and women
who are temporarily out of the labor force because of illness, un-
employment, training, or the use of a sixteen week maternity
leave.49 The credit is given a sex-based, indexed average wage
44. See generally id. § 415(b)(2)(B) (Supp. 1I 1979).
45. See id. § 415(b).
46. In response to the women's movement of the 1970's, many countries revised their
social security systems to reflect the current situation. For example, revisions occurred in
Germany in 1972, and in the United Kingdom in 1975. See CRS REPORT, supra note 23,
app. D, at 112-13.
47. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADnmS-
TRATION, SoCIAL SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 114 (1979). Under the British two-tier sys-
tem, workers must be credited for approximately forty years of work in order to qualify for
the first tier, the basic flat-rate pension. The homemaking credits are not assigned a mone-
tary value, but instead go to establishing eligibility for the flat-rate benefit which is tied to
years in the work force, rather than wages. The second tier is calculated on the twenty
highest earnings years. Id. at 131-34. See also CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 113.
48. U.S. DEPARTmENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINIS-
TRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY IN A CHANGING WORLD 128-29 (1979). Ironically, by crediting mar-
ried persons for their homemaking years, both the United Kingdom and Switzerland have
created an inequality with respect to single people. Married people with partial work histo-
ries end up with more credits than single people with the same work histories. Id. at 118.
49. Id. at 125-26.
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value.50 As in the United States, the German system does not give
homemakers credit. Unlike our system, there is no supplementary
spousal benefit to compensate for the uncredited work. 51 The Ger-
man homemaker, however, is able to buy into the system by mak-
ing her own payroll contributions, 52 an opportunity not available to
her American counterpart.
Sweden uses a two-tier system. The flat-rate, or first tier
amount, is uniformly paid to all persons at age sixty-five, regard-
less of their relationship to the paid labor force. The fifteen highest
earnings years are used to calculate the second tier.53 The unpaid
homemaker therefore will receive only the flat rate at age sixty-
five. Unless there are children under age sixteen, she receives no
dependents' benefits.5'
All of these systems create retirement income credits for the
homemaker in her own right. She either receives the flat-rate sum,
has the option to contribute voluntarily, or obtains retirement
credits for her work in the home. The American system provides
none of these options.
Social Security and the Divorced Older Woman
Because a share in the husband's pension is most unlikely for
divorced older women,55 this group of retirement age women is es-
pecially dependent on social security benefits. However, for a di-
vorced older woman to receive social security retirement and survi-
vor's benefits based upon her former husband's earnings, the
marriage must have lasted at least ten years.56 With the median
duration of marriage now less than seven years,57 the ten-year re-
50. Because the average wage is separated by sex, and because German women earn
less than German men, credits for women are given a much lower value than those for men.
Id.
51. Id. at 118.
52. Id. at 114, 126. The woman is given certain latitude in selecting the wage level
under which she will make her contributions. The woman's wage level is not tied to her
husband's wage level. Id. at 126. Inasmuch as contributions are calculated at a high 18% of
the assumed wage rate, most German homemakers do not make voluntary contributions,
and those that do usually pay at the minimum rate. Id. at 114, 126. Furthermore, benefits
based on voluntary contributions are not indexed to the inflation rate, so the homemaker's
actual benefit is quite low. Id. at 126.
53. CRS REPoRT, supra note 23, at 114.
54. Id.
55. See notes 207-11, 224-31 & accompanying text infra.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 416(d) (Supp. II 1979).
57. In 1977 and 1978, the median duration of marriage in states participating in di-
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quirement prohibits many older women from sharing in retirement
benefits although they shared the reduced marital income resulting
from the deduction of the social security payroll tax from their for-
mer husband's salary.5 8
While the divorced older woman who does qualify under the
marriage duration requirement seemingly receives the same retire-
ment benefit as the wife of the retiree-50% of the husband's Pri-
mary Insurance Amount 9 (PIA)-the figure is misleading. A re-
tiree's wife will also share the 100% of the PIA received by the
husband for a combined income of 150% of the PIA for the couple.
Thus, as a practical matter, the wife is receiving 75% of the PIA.
The divorced older woman, who as a single person has higher per
capita expenses than members of a couple, does not share a
spouse's benefits and therefore must exist on one-third less income
than a retiree's wife.
Furthermore, and again with seeming equality, the spousal
benefits for both the wife and the divorced older woman cannot
begin until the husband begins to draw his own social security.60
During this period, however, the wife is sharing in the husband's
earnings, while the divorced older woman is dependent on her own
resources."r The provision thus results in disproportionate hard-
ship to divorced older women. Severing the divorced older woman's
retirement benefits from her former husband's retirement date
would alleviate some of the problems these women face.
In addition to the provisions just discussed, the Act imposes
yet another disadvantage on the divorced older woman as com-
pared to the wife of the retiree. After the retiree dies, both the
widow and the surviving divorcee may qualify to receive survivor's
benefits equal to 100% of the decedent's PIA.62 However, the
vorce registration was 6.6 years. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, National
Center for Health Statistics, Monthly Vital Statistics Report, Final Divorce Statistics 1978,
at 4 (Table 3) (Supp. July 31, 1980).
58. Attempts to lower the length of the marriage requirement to five years were made
in H.R. 765, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), H.R. 874, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), and H.R.
7374, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980). All measures failed to pass.
59. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2) (Supp. M 1979).
60. The wife's or divorced older woman's entitlement'depends on a tie to "an individ-
ual entitled to old-age or disability insurance benefits." Id. § 402(b)(1). Such an individual is
defined, among other things, as one who has "filed application for old-age insurance bene-
fits." Id. § 402(a)(3) (1976).
61. Only 5% of the divorced women over 30 receive alimony. Department of Com-
merce, Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series P-23, No. 84, at 5 (1979).
62. Id. § 402(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1979).
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widow may retain her benefits upon remarriage after the age of
sixty,"3 whereas remarriage at any age will cause the forfeiture of
the surviving divorcee's benefits.6 '
Social Security and the Disabled Older Woman
The social security system provides not only retirement and
survivorship benefits, but also disability benefits. While the disa-
bility benefits are available under a number of circumstances,
many of the prerequisites imposed on eligibility for these benefits
operate to exclude women from being entitled to them.
The Disabled Woman Worker
Disability benefits, through either social security or the
worker's pension, may serve as a form of early retirement bene-
fits.6 5 A disabled worker in late middle age will "retire" on disabil-
ity until attaining the minimum retirement age.66 The Act recog-
nizes the early retirement characteristic of disability insurance by
establishing the minimum age for some beneficiaries at fifty.6 7
Women workers often accrue forty quarters of social security
coverage many years before retirement. 8 Even a thirty year period
of uncovered work in the home between the, earned credits and ap-
plication for benefits will not affect a woman's eligibility for old-
age benefits. The requirements are quite different, however, for eli-
gibility to receive social security disability benefits. As is the case
with retirement benefits, forty quarters of coverage are needed to
be considered eligible to receive disability benefits.69 To be eligible
63. Id. § 402 (e)(4).
64. Id. § 402(e)(1)(A) (1976). Forfeiture will occur even if the surviving divorced wife
participated in the marriage (and the reduced income resulting from the payroll contribu-
tion) for thirty years, and the widow for only three.
65. "[F]or some older workers, reemployment may not be possible under any program
due to serious Mn health or injury. For these workers, disability programs essentially have
functioned as early retirement programs." INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 39.
66. Eligibility for social security disability insurance benefits ends at age 65. 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(a)(1)(B) (1976).
67. Widows, widowers, and surviving divorced wives must be at least 50 to receive
disability benefits. Id. § 402(e)(1)(B)(ii), (f)(1)(B)(ii).
68. Most women tend to accumulate their work experience at an early age. The age
bracket with the highest proportion (76%) of women in the paid labor market is 20-24 years
old. Young, Work Experience of the Population in 1977, MoNTHLy LAB. Rav., Mar., 1979, at
54.
69. 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(A) (1976).
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for disability benefits, however, twenty quarters of coverage must
have been earned within the ten years prior to the application for
disability benefits.70 The formerly employed, fully insured woman
with even six homemaking years intervening before her application
for social security disability benefits, a pattern common to many
women, will not be able to satisfy this requirement. The forfeiture
will not be felt until a woman's later years, after she has engaged
in work in the home not covered by social security for six years
following a career in which she had accumulated forty quarters of
coverage. Disability in the later years of a homemaker's career thus
will often not bring her the early "retirement" benefits in the form
of disability payments that a male co-worker is eligible to receive.
Today, women frequently reenter the paid work force after a
period of working in the home. If a woman has raised two children
to school age, ten years can easily have passed since her last period
of covered employment. For her to regain her eligibility for disabil-
ity benefits, she would have to work twenty additional quarters
(five years). Assuming she has accumulated forty quarters of cover-
age before leaving her employment to raise a family, she effectively
has to work a total of sixty quarters to regain her eligibility for
disability benefits. This requirement severely penalizes women who
choose to combine a career of homemaking with reentry into the
paid labor force.
The Disabled Homemaker
In addition to the possibility of being precluded from receiving
social security disability benefits because of the restrictions de-
scribed above, the older wife or divorcee who becomes disabled
before she reaches age sixty-two 1 cannot receive disability benefits
on the basis of her husband's earnings. She is precluded from re-
ceiving these benefits even though she is otherwise eligible for old-
age benefits on her husband's earnings at age sixty-two. The home-
maker, along with other classes of potential disability benefi-
72ciaries, thus is dependent on the insured worker's earnings for
70. Id. § 423(c)(1)(B).
71. At 62 she can receive wife's benefits on her husband's account. Id. § 402(b)(1)(B)
(1976).
72. Beneficiaries dependent on the insured worker's record include the insured worker,
id. § 423(c)(1), and widows, widowers, surviving divorced wives, and children. Id.
§ 402(d)(1)(B)(ii), (e)(1)(B)(ii).
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support. The argument that the disabled wife may be supported by
her spouse's income exemplifies the social security system's failure
to recognize the economic value of the homemaking role, both to
the family and to society generally. The value is realized only when
the family, deprived of the homemaker's services by her disability,
must hire others to replace her.
The Disabled Widow
Although the disabled widow or surviving divorced older wo-
man may be able to receive disability benefits between the ages of
fifty and sixty,7 3 she is hindered by certain obstacles in addition to
the high minimum age requirements. For example, the insured
worker or worker's child is deemed disabled by his or her "inability
to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of [disabil-
ity], '74 the disabled widow, widower, and surviving divorced
spouse, however, are subject to a stricter test: "[impairment at a
level of severity] deemed to be sufficient to preclude. . . any gain-
ful activity. '7 5
The distinction between "substantial" gainful employment
and "any" gainful employment is made in the regulations. Gainful
work activity is broadly defined as "activity for remuneration or
profit.17 6 Substantial gainful activity is defined more narrowly as
the "performance of significant physical or mental duties ... pro-
ductive in nature. '77 Because many persons arguably can engage in
some sort of activity for remuneration or profit, albeit menial and
inadequate to meet cost of living expenses, application of the "any
gainful employment" standard to the widowed homemaker is criti-
cal. The problem is brought even more sharply into focus in light
of the fact that the woman may be fully insured as a worker for
purposes of old-age benefits, but, because of her six year absence
from coverage, is ineligible to qualify for disability as a worker
under the more lenient standard that she is unable to engage in
any substantial gainful activity.
73. See id. § 402 (e)(1)(B)(ii). H.R. 1517, 97th Cong., 1st Seas. (1980) would remove
the minimum age.
74. Id. § 423(d)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
75. Id. § 423(d)(2)(B) (emphasis added). This provision has a greater impact on wo-
men than men because although the section applies to widows and widowers alike, most
men qualify on their own PIA and not as widowers, under the dual entitlement rule.
76. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1532(b) (1980).
77. Id.
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Social Security and the Widow
Recent amendments to the Social Security Act have benefited
widows.78 They now receive 100% of their deceased spouse's PIA,79
can remarry after age sixty and retain 'their benefits, 0 and can
start receiving benefits81 at age sixty."2 A major problem that re-
mains for these women, however, is the "widow's gap," illustrated
by the following hypothetical.
W and H were married and had three children, the last of
whom, A, was born when W was twenty-nine. H died when W was
forty-one and A was twelve. Because she had children in the home
under the age of eighteen, W received a "mother's benefit;'8 3 the
children under the age of eighteen also received "children's bene-
fits. '8 4 Upon A's eighteenth birthday, W, who was then forty-
seven, lost her mother's benefit.8 5 Under the current statutory
scheme, W would be ineligible for widow's benefits until she was
sixty. If she became disabled, she could, after age fifty, attempt to
qualify for widow's disability, but she would be subject to the
stricter test, which requires the widow to prove that her disability
precludes her from engaging in any activity for remuneration or
profit, a difficult standard to meet. This gap in the widow's bene-
fits often coincides with an "early death" clause in her late hus-
band's pension plan,"' so that she may have no income at all. Be-
cause of her lack of recent paid employment and the double
burden of sex and age discrimination on older women, she may be
78. - A large percentage of the women age 65 or older are or will become widows. See
note 4 supra. The average age of widowhood in the United States is 56, and widows out-
number widowers six to one. Facts on Older Women, supra note 6, at 2.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1979).
80. Id. § 402(e)(4).
81. The benefits received are actuarially reduced. 42 U.S.C. § 402(g)(1) (1976). The
means by which the benefits are indexed, however, may result in another "early widowhood"
problem. Social security benefits are indexed by the inflation rate, while a worker's earnings
(upon which the benefit is based) are indexed by the wage rate. A deceased worker's wages,
however, are indexed by the inflation rate. Because wages have until recently outpaced infla-
tion, the effect is to tie the early widow to a standard of living that does not represent her
reasonable expectation of the standard of living she would have attained. See generally IN-
TERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 7.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(1)(B)(i) (1976).
83. Id. § 402(g)(1)(E), and (d)(1)(B)(i).
84. Id. § 402(d).
85. The benefits accruing to the children would continue until they were no longer full
time students or until they were twenty-two years of age, whichever came first. Id. §
402(d)(1)(B)(i).
86. See notes 194-97 & accompanying text infra.
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unable to find employment. Being neither disabled, blind, nor age
sixty-five, W would not qualify for public assistance under the
Supplemental Security Income program (SSI). No longer caring for
dependent children, she also would be ineligible for Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC).
The convergence of gaps of coverage for women between the
ages of forty-five and sixty in the Social Security Act, gaps which
previously have been invisible to retirement income policy plan-
ners, may leave the middle-aged widow destitute-far worse off, in
fact, than aged, blind, or disabled individuals who can qualify for
SSI. The impact of these provisions thus demonstrates the need
for a comprehensive review and possible revision of the various re-
tirement statutes.
Proposals for Change in the Social Security System
The 97th Congress is expected to give high priority to the
financial problems of the social security system. As a greater num-
ber of people become eligible for a greater amount of benefits, the
system increasingly is becoming financially unstable. To ensure the
continued viability of the system, the government is faced with a
choice of reducing benefits to certain classes of beneficiaries or de-
signing a refinancing plan for the system. The outcome of this de-
termination may affect millions of women currently on social se-
curity, especially those who soon will be eligible.
Reducing benefits to ensure the fiscal viability of the system
most likely will require the selection of certain classes of benefi-
ciaries whose benefits must be eliminated or curtailed. Because the
growing majority of American elders are women, any reduction in
benefits to this class will have severe economic consequences to the
aged population as a whole. A true refinancing plan, on the other
hand, would not single out certain classes of beneficiaries whose
benefits would be reduced or eliminated. Rather, it would seek to
stabilize the system by addressing the allocation of the tax burden
between general revenue funds and payroll taxes, or by establish-
ing a new tax base.
The most frequently proposed method of refinancing the so-
cial security system is an infusion of general revenues, either spe-
cifically to bolster certain programs or generally to bolster the eco-
nomic base of the system. Social Security Advisory Councils have
recommended for over four decades that general revenues be used
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to finance part of the social security program.8 7 In 1938, the Advi-
sory Council recommended that, over a period of time, the pro-
gram should be one-third financed from general revenue.8 Most
recently, the Council "unanimously [found] that the time has come
to finance some part of social security with nonpayroll tax
revenue.
8 9
Although an increased payroll tax also has been suggested as a
means of refinancing the system, a major disadvantage of that
method is its regressive nature. In addition, increases in the payroll
tax contribute to inflation by increasing labor costs per unit of
production."0
In general, consideration of financing methods is as much an
older woman's concern as distribution of benefits. Each proposal
discussed below will be examined from the viewpoint of older wo-
men. Although none of these proposals has yet been adopted, all
continue to be actively debated and promoted. Many of these pro-
posals are predicated upon what one older women's advocate has
called the "new myths," one of which theorizes that "women are
going into the workforce in such numbers that dependency is only
a transitional problem."9 1
87. SociAL SECURrrY FiNANCma AND BENEFrrs: REPORTS OF THE 1979 ADviSORY CoUN-
CIL ON SociAL SECURrrY 36 (1979).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 35.
90. Id. at 37.
91. T. Sommers, Gray Paper No. 2, Social Security: Adequacy and Equity for Older
Women 15 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Sommers]. One poll reported that 44% of nonwork-
ing mothers under the age of 30 stated they would look for jobs if adequate day-care facili-
ties were available. Roper Organization, Inc., The 1980 Virginia Slims American Women's
Opinion Poll 13 (1980). Seventy-three percent of the nonworking women under 30 plan to
work in the future; 62% under 40 plan to work full-time, as do 37% under 50. Id. at 10.
Finally, 52% think that by the end of the century, almost all women who can work will be
working. Id. at 33.
At least one commentator disagrees with this assumption. "Given the continuing
shrinkage of entry-level jobs and inadequacy of available child care, the assumption that the
present rate of increase of [women's] labor force participation will continue is a very dubi-
ous one. Dependency is a condition which women will have to deal with for the foreseeable
future. Considering how slowly basic changes take place, it is dangerous to assume that sex
roles are disappearing." Sommers, supra note 91, at 15. The Virginia Slim's poll found that
57% of American women approve of continued change in women's status, but 23% think
change has gone far enough. Fifteen percent think it has gone too far. Roper Organization,
Inc., The 1980 Virginia Slims American Women's Opinion Poll 33 (1980).
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Proposals Detrimental to Older Women
Tying Social Security Benefits Strictly to Wages
Social security benefits currently are weighted so that persons
on the lower end of the wage scale receive somewhat more for their
contributions than do the well-paid.9 2 In addition, there is a mini-
mum benefit.93 Because of the regressive nature of the payroll tax
and because those with high salaries pay the tax only on a portion
of their earnings, the apparent advantage conferred by weighting is
not as much an advantage as an offset against the disadvantages.
Nevertheless, some have recommended eliminating this weighting
feature of social security, along with the minimum benefit.9 4 This
proposal would tie social security benefits strictly to wages. Propo-
nents of this proposal argue that weighting and the minimum ben-
efit are welfare benefits, more appropriately a matter for SSI. 5
Thus, if a person's lifetime earnings failed to yield a social security
benefit sufficient to sustain a poverty line existence, public assis-
tance should provide the difference. This rationale forms the basis
for one proposed refinancing plan, which suggests that resorting
to partial general revenue funding will alleviate the financial
problems with social security that have resulted from the system's
dependence on its trust funds and on payroll tax. Directly supple-
menting the social security system with general revenue funds is
perceived to be politically unpopular; the SSI, however, is funded
by general revenues and if sufficient social security benefits can be
shifted onto the SSI, then in effect social security's obligations will
have been met by general revenues.
One variation of this proposal would provide a minimum pov-
erty level benefit for the low-paid worker who worked thirty years
in employment covered by social security. A worker with only
"sporadic!' ties to the paid labor force, however, would not be cov-
ered by social security, but rather would be a candidate for SSI.e
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
93. See id. § 415(a)(1)(C)(i)(I).
94. See, e.g., Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate Minimum Income in Old Age:
The Erratic Partnership Between Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 CoiiNEu L.
RaV. 437, 508-13 (1979).
95. Id. at 451-52, 508-12.
96. Id. at 515-16. The 1979 Advisory Council also recommended that social security
not attempt to provide a poverty level benefit to workers who do not spend most of their
working lives under social security. ADviSORY CouNciL ON SociAL SEcuRrry, SocIL SEcuarr
FINANcING AND BENErrs 66 (1979).
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Women, with their movement in and out of the paid labor force in
order to undertake family responsibilities, would be such workers.
The disregard of the American retirement system for unpaid work
in the home thus would create "blank spots" in the employment
record of most women in the country, even though they might have
spent a lifetime in'productive work.
Furthermore, the disenfranchised social security beneficiary
who applies for SSI will find more is involved than a simple trans-
fer of funds. Because the eligibility requirements of SSI are differ-
ent from those of social security, she will have to spend-down her
assets in excess of $1500 and prove her need. 17 These features, ab-
sent from social security, unalterably distinguish the two programs.
Forcing income-poor people to become asset-poor increases
poverty,"" and increased poverty inevitably leads to increased pub-
lic expense. The proposal for providing financial relief to social se-
curity by transferring its obligations to SSI thus is a most dubious
one. In addition, the proposal would place a disproportionate bur-
den upon older women.
Decreasing Benefits for Mothers and Children
The child of a de'ceased or retired worker currently is eligible
for benefits until age eighteen or, if a full-time student, until age
twenty-two.99 In addition, the widow will receive mother's benefits
until her youngest child is eighteen. 100 The Carter administration
proposed to eliminate the benefit for students eighteen to twenty-
two years old and to terminate the mother's benefit when the
youngest child reaches age sixteen.101
Although the proposal appears aimed at reducing social secur-
ity benefits for young adults, in reality it would increase greatly
the financial burden on middle-aged widows raising older children
through college. Further, this burden would not fall equally on wo-
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1976).
98. Nonetheless, the Advisory Council has rejected "recurrent proposals" to make so-
cial security benefits strictly proportional to earnings. ADVISORY CouNcIL ON SOCIAL SECUR-
rry, SOCIAL SECURITY FInANCING AND BENEFrrs 64 (1979).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(1)(B)(i) (1976).
100. Id. § 402(g)(1)(E).
101. Social Security Administration, Commissioner's Bulletin No. 15, at 5-6 (Dec. 31,
1979) [hereinafter cited as Bulletin No. 15]. The Advisory Council opposed this proposal. Id.
An ad hoe coalition called Save Our Security (SOS) succeeded in temporarily defeating the
proposal. Sommers, supra note 91, at 2.
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men and men, as eighty-five percent of surviving spouses are
widows.10 2
Eliminating the Lump Sum Death Benefit
Upon the death of the spouse, a $255 lump-sum payment is
made to the widow or widower or to the person paying the burial
expenses. 10 3 The Carter administration included the elimination of
the lump-sum death benefit in its social security recommenda-
tions."0' Because of the larger number of widows than widowers,
this sum is primarily a widow's benefit and its elimination would
adversely affect many older women.
Eliminating Survivor's Benefits for Currently Insured Workers
Even if a worker has not accumulated forty quarters of cover-
age, his or her survivor will receive benefits if death occurs when
the worker is "currently insured" for six of the previous thirteen
quarters. 05 The Carter administration recommended eliminating
survivor's benefits for the currently insured."' The elimination of
these benefits would have a serious effect on younger widows be-
cause their husbands are more likely not yet to have attained fully
insured status.
Eliminating Spousal and Survivor's Benefits
Critics have proposed that both spousal and survivor's benefits
be phased out entirely in the next thirty to fifty years.107 This pro-
posal would return social security to the provisions of its 1935 en-
actment, repealing amendments that were in force before the first
social security benefit was paid in 1940.
The proposal is based on the expectation that all women will
be fully and adequately employed in lifetime careers by the turn of
the century. Minimal credits for child-care years (three) are men-
102. Facts on Older Women, supra note 6, at 1.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 402(i) (1976).
104. Bulletin No. 15, supra note 101, at 5. The Advisory Council opposed this mea-
sure. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 414(b) (1976).
106. Bulletin No. 15, supra note 101, at 5. The Advisory Council recommended against
this proposal. Id.
107. CRS REPoRT, supra note 23, at 35. This was proposed by a member of the 1975
Advisory Council on Social Security. Id.
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tioned,108 but women would lose all the protections now included
in the system that compensate in part for unpaid childbearing and
rearing and discrimination in the paid labor force. If women were
to fail to achieve full economic parity with men by the target date,
a substantial displacement of funds from other sources would be
necessary to alleviate serious economic consequences.
Current figures illustrate how spousal and survivor's benefits
partially alleviate the earnings disparity between men and women.
Over twenty-two percent of the women receiving wife's or widow's
benefits also were entitled to receive benefits based upon their own
earnings.1 09 Under the dual entitlement rule, these women workers
received dependent's benefits because fifty percent of their hus-
band's entitlement exceeded one hundred percent of their own. In
addition, of the over fourteen million female beneficiaries, more
than half received benefits as wives or widows." 0
The argument for eliminating dependent's benefits is seriously
flawed. If the premise is correct and all women will be fully em-
ployed within a few decades, then the system as presently con-
structed will automatically phase out these benefits as dependency
recedes. Neither wife's nor widow's benefits are available to a per-
son whose own work record yields benefits in excess of one-half of
the benefits of the higher earning spouse. If, indeed, economic
equality is achieved, dependent's benefits will automatically
disappear.
Eliminating the Minimum Benefit
Eliminating the minimum PIA"' also has been proposed." 2
This would result in the reduction of the PIA for the beneficiaries
receiving the lowest benefits. Because women are disproportion-
ately represented in the lowest wage brackets by reason of employ-
ment discrimination, women will be more seriously affected by
such a reduction than will men.
108. Id.
109. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 4.
110. Id.
111. See 42 U.S.C.'§ 415(a)(1)(C)(i)(I) (Supp. 11 1979).
112. Eliminating the minimum PIA was a Carter administration proposal which was
not adopted. Bulletin No. 15, supra note 101, at 5. The Advisory Council opposed eliminat-
ing the minimum PIA. Id. But see Martin, Public Assurance of an Adequate Income in Old
Age: The Erratic Partnership Between Social Insurance and Public Assistance, 64 CoR-
NuL L. REV. 437, 509 (1979).
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Changing the Inflation Index
Social security benefits are tied to the Consumer Price Index
as prepared by the Department of Labor.11 Some critics have sug-
gested that, because older people have a different consumption
pattern than the general population, other indices with a lower in-
flationary rate would be more accurate."" Currently, the average
woman lives eighteen years after her sixty-fifth birthday; the aver-
age man lives less than fourteen years after his sixty-fifth birth-
day.11 5 The life expectancy for older women has a dramatic effect
on fixed incomes. Real income is halved every seven years at an
inflation rate of ten percent. 1 The average man faces two such
halving periods after age sixty-five; the average woman, three. If a
man and a woman both retire at age sixty-five with a fixed income
of $300 per month, the man at his death will have a real income of
$75 per month, while the woman's real income at her death will be
only $37.50 per month.
For this reason, cost-of-living indexing is of critical concern to
women. Cost-cutting here would be illusory because the effect
would be borne by the social security beneficiaries least able to
withstand the reduction. Millions of people existing just over the
poverty level will be forced to supplement social security with SSI.
Because recipients would require two transfer payments instead of
one, costs of administration would increase. Because need-based
public assistance programs are far more expensive to administer
than strict entitlement programs, overall costs would increase be-
cause failure of the entitlement system would serve to swell the
need-based programs.
Raising the Retirement Age
One proposal to reduce social security costs is to increase the
age at which old-age benefits are awarded. '117 If the early and nor-
mal retirement ages were increased from sixty-two and sixty-five to
113. See 42 U.S.C. § 415(i)(1)(B) (1976).
114. See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 17. The Commission has recommended
that the Bureau of Labor Statistics ascertain whether enough difference in the consumption
patterns of retired people exists to maintain a separate index. Id. at 18.
115. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 49.
116. INTERIm REPORT, supra note 7, at 16 (Table IV).
117. The Advisory Council recommended raising the age to 68 after the turn of the
century. Bulletin No. 15, supra note 101, at 4.
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sixty-five and sixty-eight respectively, costs would be greatly
reduced.11 8
This proposal would affect the retirement income of women in
those areas in which the dependent's benefit is tied to the worker's
retirement age, most notably in the case of the divorced woman.
To mitigate this efect, such legislation should include a provision
basing eligibility on the woman's retirement age, and not on her
former husband's retirement age.
Proposals Beneficial to Older Women
Increasing the number of excludable years from the zero-earn-
ing years represented by the homemaker's years outside of the
paid labor force 1 ' would have a negative impact on employed wo-
men's social security benefits because they are included in the
AIME calculation upon which retirement benefits are based. One
way to mitigate this effect would be to increase the number of
years, currently five, 20 that can be excluded from the formulation
for those persons engaged in homemaking, childrearing, or caring
for an ailing relative. Although increasing the number of excluda-
ble years would not have the same effect as crediting those years,
it would be one way of reducing the homemaking penalty.1 21
Homemaker's Credits
A further step to reduce the homemaking penalty would be to
give credits for homemaking years. A precedent for this exists in
other countries. 2 2 A precedent also exists in the United States
with respect to gratuitous credits for military service'23 and for
Japanese-Americans interned in relocation centers during World
War 11.12 Although social security payroll contributions were not
paid by these-two groups, Congress reasoned that the nation's obli-
gation to these persons could be paid by deeming the contributions
118. Not only will people receive benefits over a shorter time period, but by remaining
in the labor market, they will continue to make payroll contributions into the system.
119. See notes 46-54 & accompanying text supra.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(A) (Supp. 11 1979).
121. Studies indicate that drop-out credits would benefit 35% of all women benefi-
ciaries for an increase of 5% over the current system. WORKING PAPmiS, supra note 4, at 25.
For a more detailed discussion of the complexities of this area, see id. at 23-25.
122. See notes 46-54 & accompanying text supra.
123. 42 U.S.C. 429 (1976).
124. Id. § 431.
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to have been paid. Similarly, persons who elect to remain out of
the paid labor force in order to care for their children could be
credited for this socially useful task. These credits could be al-
lowed in the form of either bare credits or assigned value credits.
Bare credits would supply only the necessary quarters for a home-
maker to meet threshold eligibility requirements. Forty bare cred-
its would create eligibility for the minimum PIA, as well as the
other benefits attendant to fully insured status. In contrast, as-
signed value credits carry a hypothetical earnings value. For exam-
ple, Japanese-Americans interned in relocation centers during
World War II are deemed for that period to have paid into the
system at the higher of either the minimum wage or their earnings
before internment. 12 5 Congress considered this credit provision to
represent a partial repayment for the interruption of the internees'
earning years. The same formulation could be applied to women or
men who interrupt their earning years to care for young children or
older parents.
Although various proposals to credit homemaking have been
made, a number of issues that affect the scope and the extent of
the credits must be resolved. These issues include whether or not
the homemaker would be required to contribute financially,
whether marriage would be required to claim homemaking status,
whether part-time homemakers would be eligible, and what
formula would be used in calculating the amount of the credits.12 6
Transition Benefit for Widows
The widow's gap 27 is most traumatic when the husband dies
soon after the children have reached age eighteen. Ineligible for
mother's benefits (and probably pension survivor's benefits if her
husband dies before age fifty-five), the widow will have no social
security or pension income until her social security widow's benefit
begins at age sixty. A widow's transitional benefit of one year has
been proposed to help alleviate this result. 28
A one year transition period would be helpful to all widows,
125. Id.
126. For a discussion of the complexities presented by crediting work at home, see
WORKING PAPms, supra note 4, at 26-27.,
127. See notes 83-91 & accompanying text supra.
128. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 124. H.R. 1516, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981),
would provide widows over the age of 50 a four-month transitional benefit, but failed to pass
Congress.
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but would be most realistic when applied to younger, childless wid-
ows with better employment prospects. The truly displaced home-
maker, ineligible for mother's benefits because her children are
grown, is generally in her fifties, without recent paid work experi-
ence, and is virtually unemployable. A woman in this situation
should be eligible to receive full widow's benefits at age fifty, thus
restricting the need for a transitional benefit to younger widows.
Restructuring Social Security
In response to a congressional mandate,129 the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare issued a comprehensive report in
early 1979,130 presenting two models for a restructured social secur-
ity system-one based on earnings sharing and the other a two-tier
approach.
Under the earnings-sharing model, wives' and widows' benefits
would be eliminated because they would have their own PIA.13 1
While single, a person would build her or his own social security
record based on wages. The credits earned by either the husband
or the wife during marriage would be divided equally between the
spouses upon divorce or for the purpose of computing retirement
benefits.3 2 Divorcing spouses would take their shared credits from
the marriage without having to satisfy the ten-year marriage
rule.133 In addition, the divorced older woman would not have to
await her former husband's retirement before her own benefits
would begin.
Earnings sharing would eliminate the problem of including
homemaking years as zero-earnings years in the AIME calculation
upon which retirement benefits are based for homemakers by di-
viding the marital credits whether or not both spouses were in the
129. See Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 341, 91 Stat.
1509. The mandate was to make a detailed study of proposals to eliminate dependency as a
factor in the determination of entitlement to spouse's benefits " . . . and of proposals to
bring about equal treatment for men and women in any and all respects under such pro-
gram, taking into account the practical effects (particularly the effect upon women's entitle-
ment to such benefits) of factors such as, (1) changes in the nature and extent of women's
participation in the labor force, (2) the increasing divorce rate, and (3) the economic value
of women's work in the home." Id. § 341(a).
130. HEW REPORT, supra note 5.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 42.
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paid labor force.134 In effect, the zero years would be borne by both
spouses. Although homemakers would share equally in the benefits
based on the couple's wages, homemaking as an occupation would
still not be given credit recognition.135
Under a two-tier or "double decker" system,3 6 everyone in the
country would be entitled to first-tier social security benefits upon
reaching age sixty-five or upon incurring a disability.'3 7 Former ties
to the paid labor force would be irrelevant. Homemakers, there-
fore, would receive benefits in their own right.
The second tier of social security benefits would be earnings-
related. It would not be weighted in favor of the lower earner be-
cause the first tier of benefits theoretically would provide that min-
imal protection. s38 The second tier of benefits would be allocated
under a modified earnings sharing model, with the earnings credits
accrued during a marriage being split upon divorce or inherited
upon widowhood. 39
Under the two-tier system, divorced spouses would no longer
be subject to the ten-year marriage requirement, nor would they
have to await the retirement of their former spouses." 0 Rather,
they would be entitled in their own right to benefits under the first
tier as well as the earnings-sharing characteristic of the second tier.
134. Id.
135. The HEW earnings sharings model has been criticized by some who observe that
the concept would benefit couples with two earning partners at the expense of the career
homemaker. One activist cautioned against attempting to solve inequities by pitting one
group of women against another: "There appears to be confusion about equal treatment for
men and women and equal treatment between working women and dependent homemakers.
This may reflect the bias of career women who have been in the forefront of social security
reform efforts as well as pressures by male policy makers, who often attempt to pit women
against each other. Both options [earnings sharings and two-tier] improve the benefits of
working women, not at the expense of males, but of homemakers, except in the case of
divorce." Sommers, supra note 91, at 10-11. A package of bills that would have instituted
earnings sharings was introduced to Congress by Representative Mary Rose Oakar of Ohio.
The package includes H.R. 1513, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 1514, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1981); and H.R. 1515, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). These bills avoid the difficulties in
the HEW model by permitting couples to elect the higher of the two computations.
136. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 71.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 72.
140. Id.
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The Second Leg: Pensions
The second leg of the retirement income stool is the pen-
sion.14 1 For women, however, this leg is likely to be nonexistent.
Only eighteen percent of retirement age women receive a pension,
either on their own records of earnings or on their husbands', com-
pared to thirty-eight percent of retirement age men.142
As with social security, the pension problem is twofold. Most
women are not covered by pension plans. Although forty-nine per-
cent of the male employees in the private sector are in occupations
covered by a pension plan, only twenty-one percent of the female
employees work in such jobs.'4  When homemaking is included as
an occupation, the percentage of women in occupations covered by
a pension plan is even less. Secondly, even if a woman does have
an interest in a pension based upon her own record of earnings, the
average benefit is only fifty-nine percent of a man's average
benefit.,4
The difficulty older women have in obtaining pensions is par-
tially explained by the wage related nature of pension benefits:
lower earners receive lower pensions. The forty percent differential
between men's and women's wages is carried into retirement. Un-
like social security regulations, however, provisions that are stan-
141. Pension plans today control a large percentage of American capital. The aggre-
gate assets of public and private plans at the end 6f 1979 was $609,000,000,000. SEC Direc-
torate of Economic and Policy Analysis, Assets of Private and Public Pension Funds (Aug.
12, 1980), reprinted in Los Angeles Daily Journal, Sept. 26, 1980, at 13. This figure exceeds
the total fiscal budget for all federal expenditures by the United States government in 1978
and is expected to exceed $1,300,000,000,000 before the end of the decade. Rifkin & Barber,
American Workers own $550 Billion, in RETRumENT INcoME 11 (1979) (RrTREPJENT INcoME
is a report of the Pension Rights Center, a nonprofit organization located in Washington
D.C.). For both sexes, however, this leg of the stool is short. In 1976, 91% of single elders
reported receiving social security benefits while only 14% reported receiving private pen-
sions and 8% reported receiving government pensions. PENSION FACrs, supra note 18, at 45
(Table 20). Their married counterparts received more of each type of income: 94% receive
social security, 28% have some type of private pension, and 12% have government pensions.
Id. The lower figures for single elders undoubtedly reflect the fact that older women
predominate in the group; three-fifths of all women age 65 and over are unmarried, while
three-fourths of men in that group are married. Facts on Older Women, supra note 6, at 1.
Furthermore, even before social security automatic cost of living adjustments were enacted,
the proportion of retirement income attributable to pension income was dropping. PENSION
FATs, supra note 18, at 47 (Table 22). Because very few pensions are tied to the cost of
living, this proportion can be expected to drop still further.
142. WORKING PAPERS, supra note 4, at 31 (Table 6).
143. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 3.
144. Id. at 41.
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dard in most pension plans have such a discriminatory impact on
women that their ultimate receipt of an adequate pension is un-
likely. For example, while survivor's benefits under social security
are automatic, even for the divorced wife, survivor's benefits under
most public and private pension plans are optional for the wife and
nonexistent for the divorced spouse. The result has been that,
prior to the enactment of ERISA in 1974, only two percent of wid-
ows received survivor's benefits from their husbands' pensions.' 45
Since the enactment of ERISA, the figure has risen to between five
and ten percent.' 40
Private Pensions
In 1974, Congress enacted ERISA,' 47 the first comprehensive
federal pension reform law. ERISA provides increased security for
private pensioners, and sets forth minimum standards applicable
to private pension plans. Nevertheless, ERISA contains many
weaknesses, especially for women.' e
ERISA and the Retired Working Woman
ERISA does not make pensions mandatory;14 9 the decision to
establish a pension plan is made solely by private employers. If the
employer elects to establish a plan, ERISA provisions establish
minimum standards that must be met in order to "qualify" the
145. Pension Rights Center, PENsiON FACTS 2, at 1 (1979).
146. Statement of Edith Fierst on Private Pension Problems of Women, before the
President's Commission on Pension Policy (Nov. 30, 1979) (Ms. Fierst was staff Advisor on
Retirement Income to the Inter-departmental Task Force on Women, an agency of the exec-
utive branch).
147. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
148. "ERISA does not provide security for all employees, nor does it rectify all inequi-
ties. But the law is a vast improvement over the past, and it prevents many past injustices
from recurring." ERISA-General Information About the Employee Retirement Income Se-
curity Act (1979) (pamphlet of the Department of Labor, Labor-Management Services
Administration).
149. This decision has far-reaching implications for retirement income generally.
Without mandatory pension coverage, the proportion of the private pension's contribution
to retirement income as a whole will continue to decrease due to cost of living indexing of
social security and the lack thereof for pensions. See note 141 supra. Unless policy makers
concede that social security will no longer be supplementary to pensions, but will become in
effect the sole retirement income source for the nation's elders, the three-legged stool will
collapse. The President's Commission on Pension Policy is giving universal, mandatory pen-
sion coverage serious study. INTEm REPORT, supra note 7, at 10. The Commission's final
report was due to be published in February, 1981.
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plan for certain tax benefits. Unfortunately for the woman worker,
the minimum standards reflect the work pattern traditionally re-
warded by pensions, and historically that of men: long-term, full-
time, and well-paid employment.1 0 Movement into and out of the
paid labor force, or movement from low-paid job to low-paid job,
will not earn a pension. The following discussion examines the
types of pension provisions that contribute to the retirement in-
come crisis faced by older women.
Provisions that Cause Forfeitures
An employee must remain in a particular employer's work
force for a minimum duration for pension rights to vest. ERISA
permits employers to select one of three vesting schedules set forth
in the Act.151 Most select the "cliff-vesting" option,1 2 which re-
quires ten years of covered employment before the worker's right
to the pension vests. The other two options compel a partial vest-
ing at five years.153 Thus, the one out of five women who work in
covered employment must, as a threshold requirement, remain
with that particular employer at least five years for a partial pen-
sion and ten years for a full pension.
The nature of women's employment patterns is such that most
will not work long enough for one employer for their rights to a
pension to vest. Women have greater job mobility than men;" in
1978, the average American male changed jobs every 4.6 years,
while the average woman changed jobs every 2.8 years.'55 If private
pensions are going to form a significant portion of retirement in-
come of older women, vesting periods will have to be reduced. 56
150. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 4.
151. See 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2) (1976).
152. Id. § 1053(a)(2)(A). See CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 42.
153. 29 U.S.C. § 1053(a)(2)(B)-(C) (1976).
154. In 1978, after the age of 25, the average woman's job tenure was 38-48% less than
the average man's. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of Labor, News Release USDL
79-285 (Apr. 23, 1979). Among women, those over age 55 had the longest tenure--8.4
years-which is still over a year short of vesting under most plans. In contrast, men
achieved 11 years tenure at age 45 and remained above that figure until retirement age. Id.
155. Id.
156. One interesting possibility is that of utilizing tax regulations to encourage earlier
vesting in pensioh plans of professional corporations. Section 411(d)(1)(B) of the Internal
Revenue Code provides that plans that discriminate in favor of upper-echelon employees as
a consequence of their provisions for accrual or forfeiture of benefits will be disqualified.
One proposed regulation would have effectively disqualified as discriminatory plans that
facially comply with ERISA's vesting requirements, but in fact discriminate against the
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In addition, if an employee who has not yet acquired vested
pension rights leaves his or her employer for a period of time and
then returns, a "break in service" has occurred. If the break equals
or exceeds the earlier period of employment, the vesting period
starts anew. 157 Mobile workers are disadvantaged by this require-
ment. For many older women who have combined paid employ-
ment with working in the home, this provision has resulted in re-
duced retirement income.
Employers also are not required to include part-time or sea-
sonal workers in the pension plan. 158 Therefore, employees who
work nineteen hours or less per week, or who work full-time for a
few months per year, will not earn a pension. This includes the
long-term, part-time worker, such as the office nurse who comes in
twice a week for twenty years or the bookkeeper who works forty
hours per week for three months during tax season over a period of
fifteen years. Because a much greater percentage of female thah
male employees works part-time,15 9 this requirement has a dispa-
rate impact on women.
If mobile women workers could take their pension credits with
them when they changed or took breaks from jobs, thus accumu-
lating the credits over several years in and out of the paid labor
force with several different employers, many of the problems of
forfeiture to which older women are subject would be alleviated.
Pension portability is defined in two ways. The more restric-
tive meaning refers to the portability of vested pension credits.160
This type of portability would not be as useful to many women
because of their failure to acquire vested pensions. The second
type of portability is modeled after social security, in which credits
accumulate in the system from the first quarter of employment re-
gardiess of when or where earned.18 ' Portability of unvested pen-
sion credits would be a major pension law reform for women.16 2
lower paid employees who routinely fail to work the number of years required for the plan
to vest. 45 Fed. Reg. 24,201 (1980). The regulation was not approved.
157. 29 U.S.C. § 1052(b)(4) (1976).
158. The statute defines this class as those employees who, work less than 1000 hours
per year. Id. § 1054 (b)(3)(C).
159. In 1977, 33% of all women employees worked part-time as compared to 12% of
male employees. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 42.
160. See id. at 44-45.
161. See id.
162. Some pension experts advocate the establishment of a federal portability fund for
this purpose. See id. at 45. Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder advocates a federal clearing-
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The obstacles of cliff-vesting, break in service forfeiture, and the
exclusion of part-time workers from ERISA thereby could be
overcome.
If, in addition to the portability of unvested pension credits
and earlier vesting, employers were required to furnish a qualified
pension plan to all employees, a significant component of retire-
ment income would be in place for many more retired women.l s
All working women would be covered, instead of one in five, and
the mobility and part-time characteristics of the female work force
would no longer cause forfeitures.
In its most far-reaching recommendation, the President's
Commission on Pension Policy proposed to the President that "se-
rious consideration should be given to the establishment of a uni-
versal minimum advance-funded pension system. Such a program
could be thought of as an advance-funded tier of social security
that would permit contracting out to pension plans that wanted to
meet its standard, or as a universal, employee pension system with
a central portability clearinghouse."' ' The Commission's interim
recommendation has been criticized, however, as an industry-
backed method of increasing capital formation, rather than a par-
ticipant-oriented solution,6 5 because the report recommended
mandatory coverage without recommending mandatory benefits.
Time of vesting and other problems would remain under this
proposal.166
Provisions that Reduce the Amount of Pension Benefits Received
By Women
The eighteen percent of retired working women who do receive
a pension receive on the average less than do men. 67 This fact can
house for this purpose. BRISA Improvements Act of 1979: Hearings on S. 209 Before the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1046 (1979).
163. It has been predicted that under the present system, only 50% to 60% of the
labor force, male and female, will be working in jobs covered by a pension plan. Rich, Pen-
sions: Too Few, Tdo Small for Most, in RETEMENT INcoME 1, 16 (1979) (a report of the
Pension Rights Center).
164. INTERIM RnpORT, supra note 7, at 10.
165. CrrIzEN's COMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, CrrZEN's GUIDE TO THE PRESIDENT's
COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY INTERim REPORT 1980, at 21-26 (1980). The Citizen's Com-
mission is a private organization that monitors the activities of the President's Commission.
166. Id. at 25.
167. According to the Census Bureau, in 1976 the median private pension benefit was
$1833 per year for unmarried men, and $1351 for unmarried women. CRS REPORT, supra
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be partially attributed to women's lower wages. Several ERISA
provisions, however, which function to reduce the amount of bene-
fits that a worker is eligible to receive, have a disparate impact on
women workers.
ERISA also permits plans to increase the rate at which bene-
fits accrue in the later years of employment. 168 A worker employed
under such a plan for thirty years thus would accrue benefits at a
higher rate in his or her final decade of employment than in the
first. This kind of plan favors traditionally male employment pat-
terns and results in lower pension checks for retired women.
Furthermore, under ERISA, plans are permitted to offer a
pension benefit that is "integrated" with social security. Under
such a plan, the worker's pension benefit is calculated so that,
taken in conjunction with the worker's social security benefit, the
total amount equals a certain percentage of his or her final salary
before retirement.16 9 Because social security benefits are weighted
in favor of the lower-paid worker, the percentage of a lower-paid
worker's wages represented by the worker's social security benefits
is higher than for the well-paid worker. Thus, the plan will have to
pay a smaller percentage of the lower-paid worker's final wages in
order to meet, with social security, the combined benefit. Under an
integrated plan, the weighting of social security in favor of lower-
paid earners is rendered negligible by the weighting of the pension
in favor of the higher-paid worker.170
An integrated plan will mean fewer pension benefits for work-
ers whose wages do not exceed the social security wage-base.1 71 Be-
cause women are overrepresented among the low earners, they will
be overrepresented among those whose pension rights fail to vest.
Most pensions are paid as annuities calculated on the basis of ac-
tuarial tables separated by sex, rather than being paid in a lump
sum at retirement. The rationale for calculating separate actuarial
tables on the basis of sex is the greater average longevity of wo-
note 23, at 41.
168. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(B) (1976). The credits in the later years may be up to one
third higher than those in the earlier years.
169. See CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 50.
170. Id.
171. The wage base for 1981 is $29,700.42 U.S.C. § 430(c)(2)(D) (Supp. 11 1979). It
has been estimated that 25% of the workers in covered employment will receive little or no
pension under an integrated plan. Blumenthal, Lower-Paid Workers Losing Pensions, in
Rgrmm NT INco~m 6 (1979) (report of the Pension Rights Center).
May 1981] WOMEN AND RETIREMENT 1225
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
men. 172 The result for women is that they receive either a larger
premium or a smaller monthly benefit.'1" -
In City of Los Angeles Department of Water & Power v.
Manhart,17 4 a case brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964,115 the United States Supreme Court held that an employer
violated the Act when he or she required women to pay higher con-
tributions to a pension plan than men for the same monthly bene-
fit.1 " The Court reasoned that despite the greater longevity of wo-
men as a class, requiring individual women, who may or may not
exceed the average male lifespan, to pay a higher premium violated
Title VII.177 The Court, however, expressly stated that its holding
does not imply that there would be a Title VII violation when
equal contributions were required of each employee and then used
to purchase in the open market what may be an unequal benefit
for an individual retiree.178
Although conceptually significant, Manhart directly affected
only that minority of private pension plans that require employee
contributions.1 9 Furthermore, a system that permits a lower pen-
sion benefit for an equal contribution has a much more adverse
impact on retirement income for women than one as in Manhart,
172. Various factors have been found to contribute to longevity, such as race, marital
status, occupation, smoking habits, and place of residence. Only sex, however, has been used
as a factor in determining the actuarial tables used by pension funds. Gender based actua-
rial tables apparently are not offensive enough to be considered unconstitutional. "Race is
not now determined as a composition factor of the group [life insurance] because of its
social unacceptability. . . ." Randall, Consultation on Discrimination Against Minorities
and Women in Pensions and Health, Life, and Disability Insurance, Risk Classification and
Actuarial Tables as They Affect Insurance Pricing for Women and Minorities app., at 22
(1979) (prepared for the United States Commission on Civil Rights). Ironically, the move to
unisex tables by some states has its precedence in automobile liability insurance coverage
tables designed to lessen the cost of insurance to male drivers. The Participant (Mar. 1980)
(publication of the Teachers' Insurance and Annuity Association-College Retirement Eq-
uity Fund).
173. For an interesting compilation of actuarial data that affect women see generally
id.
174. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
175. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
176. Women paid monthly contributions that were almost 15% higher than men's. 435
U.S. at 705. The Court stated that "[t]o insure the flabby and the fit as though they were
equivalent risks may be more common than treating men and women alike; but nothing
more than mere habit makes one subsidy seem less fair than the other." Id. at 710.
177. Id. at 708.
178. Id. at 717-18.
179. See CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 48. Public pensions, as in Manhart, usually
do require employee contributions.
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which disburses an equal pension for which a larger monthly con-
tribution was paid.
Another form of discrimination that lowers retirement income
for older women is found in tax regulations. When an annuity is
received, the Internal Revenue Service excludes a portion of it
from income as a return of capital. 80 The exclusion formula is cal-
culated on sex-based tables. If a man and woman receive equal an-
nuities based on equal contributions, he may pay income tax on
one-sixth of his annuity, while she may be taxed on one-third. This
inequity results because under the IRS's tables, a woman is pre-
sumed to have a longer time in which to collect annuity payments;
therefore credit for her original investment is spread over a longer
period, resulting in a higher monthly taxable income. Whether or
not the individual woman will outlive the average male is not
taken into consideration. Thus, not only will women annuitants
generally receive a smaller amount in return for equal contribu-
tions, they will pay taxes on a larger percentage.of their annuity
benefits. This is another example of the compounding effect of
seemingly legitimate procedures that differentiate on the basis of
sex.
Lack of indexing further impairs the retirement income of wo-
men because the one-third increased life expectancy of women over
age sixty-five compared with that of men results in women's fixed
income being subject to longer exposure to the devastating effects
of inflation.' Private pensions, as contrasted to social security, are
seldom tied to any index at all.'82 Until appropriate cost-of-living
indexing is part of all retirement income, women's longevity inevi-
tably will contribute to the lower overall income older women
receive.18 3
ERISA and the Retired Wife
As under social security, homemaking is not considered to be a
pensionable activity under ERISA. Neither private nor govern-
180. See Tress. Reg. § 1.72-9.
181. See notes 113-16 & accompanying text supra.
182. Over 93 % of all private plans are not indexed. PENSION FACTS, supra note 18, at
47.
183. The proposed ERISA Improvements Act of 1979 would, inter alia, have required
the Secretary of Labor to conduct a study of the feasibility and ramifications of requiring
pension plans to provide cost of living adjustments. S. 209 § 152, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979). This comprehensive bill did not pass the 96th Congress.
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ment plans provide for splitting of pension credits between
spouses. Unless a homemaker has been in the paid labor force long
enough to gain a vested pension in her own right, she will have no
pension income upon her husband's retirement.
Social security provides a dependency benefit to the spouse.'"
Although this spousal benefit is tied to the worker's account, it
nevertheless recognizes the economic nature of the marital unit.1 5
Pensions, however, adhere to insurance principles. The single
worker and the married worker will receive the same pension. No
spousal benefit is paid.
ERISA does require that pension plans offer a "joint and sur-
vivor" annuity. 86 But if the election is made to provide a survi-
vor's benefit to the wife, the joint annuity, paid during the couple's
joint life, will be actuarially reduced.1 87 This reduction produces an
effect opposite to that produced by social security. Instead of an
increased benefit, the couple receives a reduced benefit. The home-
making spouse becomes a financial liability, rather than an asset.
Not only is her contribution to the productivity of her spouse un-
recognized, its effect on pension benefits is negative.
ERISA and the Widow
The Opt-out
Before the enactment of ERISA, pension plans were not re-
quired to offer a survivor's benefit. Those plans that did usually
required that the retiree "opt-in" upon retirement. 88 ERISA now
requires that pension plans that pay benefits in the form of an an-
nuity offer a joint and survivor annuity."8 The married retiree, un-
less he or she opts out, will receive the reduced joint benefit.1 90
The opt-out feature is a major cause of the poverty of older
women. While the option not to provide for survivor's benefits to
the spouse must be exercised by the retiree in writing, 91 neither
184. See notes 37-43 & accompanying text supra.
185. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 10.
186. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1976).
187. Id. § 1055(h).
188. Pension Rights Center, PENSION FACTs 2, at 2 (1979).
189. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(a) (1976).
190. Id. § 1055(e).
191. The insurance industry opposes spousal notification or consent on the basis of the
cost of the paperwork involved. Beshgetoor, Insurance Association Opposes Increased Sur-
vivor Protection, in RITrs NT INcoME 9 (1979) (report of the Pension Rights Center).
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spousal consent nor notification of the election is required by the
Act. 92 Furthermore, ERISA does not merely permit an opt-out
provision, it mandates it. 98 Thus, a plan with an automatic survi-
vor's benefit would not satisfy the Act.
Complete Forfeiture
The second major problem for widows under ERISA is the for-
feiture of the entire benefit, including the survivor's annuity, if the
husband dies before reaching his plan's early retirement age.'9" If
the couple has planned their retirement around the pension, thus
de-emphasizing investment or employment for the wife, the effect
on the widow is devastating. "'95
The unprotected gap in pension rights for middle-aged mar-
ried women coincides with the social security widow's gap.196 If the
husband of a fifty year old woman with grown children dies before
his plan's early retirement age, his widow will receive no pension,
no social security until age sixty, and no SSI, and is ineligible for
unemployment benefits. When this lack of benefits is coupled with
her minimal opportunity for paid employment and the stricter test
for social security disability benefits that is applied to widows, a
decade or more of unprotected years may result. 9
7
Survivor's Annuity Reduction
ERISA permits the joint annuity paid during the lives of the
192. Legislation that would have amended ERISA to require the written consent of
both spouses before an election to opt-out is made failed to pass the 96th Congress. See S.
209, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). H.R. 5167, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979). This legislation is
expected to be reintroduced.
193. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e) (1976).
194. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(b) (1976). This age varies with each plan, but generally ranges
from 50 to 60. i
195. S. 209 would have required that the employees make the election whether or not
to provide survivor's benefits at the time of vesting, rather than at retirement. This would
have provided widows whose husbands had vested and had elected not to opt-out, with
preretirement death protection. See S. 209 § 127, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill failed
to pass.
196. See notes 83-91 & accompanying text, supra.
197. The President's Commission on Pension Policy recommended that survivor's
benefits or life insurance be available to survivors of vested workers who die before retire-
ment. INTEIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 33. This recommendation has been criticized as
being inadequate because life insurance does not offer the retirement protection a survivor's
annuity does. CrITzENs COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY, CITIZEN's GuEDE TO THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON PENSION POLICY INTERIM REPORT 1980, at 29 (1980).
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couple to be actuarially reduced.198 When the worker dies, the sur-
viving spouse's annuity can be reduced to as little as one-half of
the actuarially-reduced joint annuity.19 The worker's benefits are
not subject to this reduction. For example, if the full single annu-
ity were $100, and the joint annuity $80, the survivor's pension
could be as low as $40 per month. This provision reduces the pen-
sion income of older widows in relation to older widowers.
Remarriage Forfeiture
Under social security 00 and some public retirement plans,20 1
remarriage of a widow after age sixty will not terminate her survi-
vor's benefits. ERISA is silent on the issue, with the result that
private plans permitting remarriage without loss of benefits are
rare. The pensioned worker can remarry at any time without pen-
alty. His annuity is unaffected, just as it is upon his wife's death.
ERISA also permits the denial of survivor's benefits to a wife who
marries the retiree after he retires.02
Need for Conceptual Reform of Survivor's Annuities
ERISA codified the joint and survivor's provisions without
recognizing the economic nature of the marital unit. The collateral
issue of the marital property rights of both spouses arises; because
both shared equally in the lower wages paid in return for the pack-
age of fringe benefits, both should share equally in the resulting
benefits. Benefit sharing could be accomplished within the frame-
work of sound insurance principles. Pension plans, as group insur-
ance plans, adjust premiums to the characteristics of the group.
Instead of treating the homemaking spouse as a liability, she
should be included in the group on the same basis as her spouse,
198. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(h) (1976).
199. Id. § 1055 (g)(3).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 402(e)(4) (Supp. 1I 1979).
201. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 8341(d)(B) (Supp. III 1979) (Civil Service Retirement); 10
U.S.C. § 1450(b) (1976) (Uniformed Services Retirement).
202. ERISA only requires a reasonable period (set by the Secretary of the Treasury by
regulation) before the annuity starting date within which election to opt-out of the plan
must be made. 29 U.S.C. § 1055(e) (1976). Most plans deem the decision irrevocable after
the first day of retirement. If a woman marries a retired man on a single annuity, it will not
be subject to reduction to a joint annuity in order to provide her with survivor's benefits.
Note, however, that, if a worker marries shortly before retirement, elects the joint and survi-
vor benefit, but dies before their first anniversary, the plan need not pay the survivor's
benefits. Id. § 1055(d).
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and premiums adjusted accordingly. 0 " The result would be no re-
duction of the joint annuity, no reduction of the survivor's annuity,
a vested right to the pension credits accrued before early death,
and the elimination of the remarriage forfeiture. The increased
cost of this protection could be borne by the group as a whole, as
with social security, or through an increased premium paid by the
married worker while employed.
ERISA and the Divorced Wife
Whether a pension is divisible upon divorce depends upon the
property laws of the particular state. ° In California, for example,
even unvested pension credits earned during the marriage are held
to be community property.205 Once the pension is determined to be
community property, the crucial question becomes how the pen-
sion is to be awarded.
An older divorcing couple's principal assets most often are the
home and the pension fund. Frequently the negotiated settlement
involves an exchange of the fund for the house-the woman keep-
203. Including homemakers in the coverage group is the current practice of many em-
ployment-related group health plans. But even under these plans, the dependent's coverage
is not secure if she leaves the group by reason of divorce or widowhood. Some states have
enacted statutes that require that group health policies provide for rights of conversion to
individual policies for new widows and divorced spouses leaving the group;. See CAL. INS.
CODE §§ 10126, 11512.6; ILL. Rav. STAT. ANN. 73-979e; N.Y. CONSOL. LAws § 162(5).
204. As the President's Commission on Pension Policy found: "The treatment of pen-
sions in divorce settlements varies greatly by state. The eight community property states
view marriage as an equal partnership, and upon divorce, divide property acquired during
the marriage equally between the spouses. Seven additional states have adopted the Uni-
form Dissolution of Marriage Act that also equally divides property acquired during the
marriage. Some states, however, do not consider future entitlement to a pension as the em-
ployee's property, especially if the pension is not vested. Therefore, pension assets are not
valued in some divorce settlements, even in states where marriage is viewed as an equal
partnership. The 12 common law states equally divide only jointly-held assets, but some
allow the court to 'equitably' distribute property at divorce which may or may not include
pension assets. The other 23 states generally give the courts discretion to divide a couple's
assets in a fair manner." WORKING PApmsS, supra note 4, at 34. The President's Commission
has recommended that pensions be defined as property. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at
32. But the Citizen's Commission on Pension Policy has pointed out that defining a pension
as property does not go far enough, because property can be defined as separate property.
The Citizen's Commission recommended that pensions be defined as "marital" or "joint"
property. CrZEN'S COMMSSION ON PENSION POLICY, CIrIZEN's GUIDmE TO THE PRzsDE.NT's
COMMSSION ON PENSION POLICY, INTERIM REPORT 1980, at 29 (1980).
205. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976).
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ing the home, and the man the pension.20 However psychologically
and economically advantageous this arrangement may be for the
woman at the time of the divorce, its effect often is to lower the
retirement income of divorced older women as compared to di-
vorced older men. Another frequent property settlement device in-
volves the exchange of the woman's pension rights for personal
property or other consideration. This settlement, although increas-
ing her share of marital property at the time of dissolution, will
adversely affect the divorced wife's income upon reaching retire-
ment age.
If a share of the pension payments are awarded to the wife,
her retirement income will be more secure if the fund issues
monthly annuity payments directly to her. In Carpenters Pension
Trust Fund v. Kronschnabel,20 7 the Ninth Circuit recently upheld
a California decision ordering a pension plan to make separate
payments to divorced spouses. The United States Supreme Court
also has let stand a series of California decisions ordering pension
payments to be made directly to divorced wives.20 8 Finally, even
though some states recognize that retirement benefits are marital
property, no state extends that recognition to survivor's benefits.
The divorced wife's benefits end upon the death of her former
husband.09
Private pensions add to the per unit labor cost of all goods
and services. In addition, many employers believe long vesting
schedules encourage employee stability to the benefit of the partic-
ular enterprise and the economy as a whole. Balanced against these
considerations is the disproportionate representation of older wo-
men among the poor. The failure of the pension system to accom-
modate women's work patterns inevitably has resulted in the grow-
ing social and economic cost to every citizen in caring for this class
of individuals.
206. See Seal, No-Fault Divorce: A Financial Disaster for California Women (1978)
(unpublished manuscript available at the Older Women's Leigue, Oakland, California).
207. 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980).
208. San Francisco Recorder, Jan. 15, 1980, at 1.
209. "However, even those courts which consider the pension part of the marital kitty
award the spouse a portion of the retirement benefits during the lifetime of the retiree only.
Therefore, payments cease after the death of the retired federal employee, and the spouse is
deprived of any survivor's benefits." 125 CONG. REc. E1069 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1979) (re-
marks of Rep. Schroeder).
The President's Commission on Pension Policy recommended that a pro-rata share of
survivor's benefits be assigned to the former spouse. IwTrmM REPORT, supra note 7, at 33.
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Government Pensions
Most federal employees are covered under the vast Civil Ser-
vice Retirement system (CSR) or the Uniformed Services Retire-
ment system210 (USR). In addition, railroad workers are covered by
the federal Railroad Retirement system2 1 . (RR). However, neither
CSR nor RR workers are covered by social security. Thus, they
rely heavily on their pension plans for retirement income. Further-
more, in contrast to workers covered under private plans, most
government workers make payroll contributions to their plans.2 12
Universal Coverage
Most of the ten percent of paid workers still uncovered by so-
cial security are federal, state, and local employees. The extension
of social security coverage to all paid workers in the nation has
been recently proposed. 3
Civil service and military pensions, like most private pen-
sions,211 permit the retiree to "opt-out" of a survivor's benefit.215
The retiree alone makes the decision, and in some cases, no notice
need be provided to the spouse.216 Such a decision can have serious
effects for the civil service widow because she is not covered under
the widow's benefit provided by social security. Similarly, the di-
vorced spouse of a civil servant is almost certainly not provided for
under the plan, either with retirement or survivor's benefits. 17
Surviving divorced women without social security benefits very
likely have no retirement income at all. Such situations exemplify,
210. Civil Service Retirement is provided at 5 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8348 (1976 & Supp. III
1979). The Uniformed Services Retirement provisions are at 10 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1455 (1976 &
Supp. 1I 1979). Ninety-seven percent of federal employees are covered under one of these
two plans. CRS REPORT, supra note 23, at 52. Civil Service Retirement covers 2,700,000
federal employees. Id.
211. 45 U.S.C. §§ 231-231t (1976 & Supp. IH 1979).
212. For example, civil service plan participants pay seven percent of their basic pay. 5
U.S.C. § 8334(a)(1) (1976).
213. The 95th Congress, in Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 341, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977), mandated
the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to undertake a thorough study of universal
coverage. The Advisory Council on Social Security recommended universal coverage be im-
plemented. Bulletin No. 15, supra note 101, at 4, 21-22.
214. See notes 188-193 & accompanying text supra.
215. See 5 U.S.C. § 8341(b)(1) (Supp. HI 1979); 10 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1976).
216. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1448(a) (1976). A recent enactment requires notification to a
civil service retiree's spouse if he or she is opted-out. See Pub. L. No. 96-391, 94 Stat. 1557
(1980).
217. See notes 220-31 & accompanying text infra.
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the need for universal coverage by social security.
Government Pensions and the Retired Woman
Government plans suffer from drawbacks similar to those of
ERISA-regulated plans with respect to retired women, including
the reflection of lower wages in lower benefits, backloading, and
vesting problems. CSR does provide vesting after five years,218 but
this period still is too long for many women. One advantage most
government retirees enjoy is cost-of-living indexing.219
Government Pensions and the Divorced Wife
Women who were married to government employees are espe-
cially vulnerable to weaknesses in the dependent's benefits, be-
cause of little or no social security coverage. Until recently, no ma-
jor government plan provided for a divorced wife, regardless of the
length of the marriage.220 Foreign Service wives are the only fed-
eral employee wives now provided for under a major plan in the
event of divorce. 21
The United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo v. His-
quierdo,222 overruled the California Supreme Court 23 and held
that, in the case of RR beneficiaries, congressional intent was clear
that such benefits were not marital property.224 Following His-
quierdo, Congress acted to make CSR pensions expressly subject to
218. 5 U.S.C. § 8333(a) (1976).
219. Half of state retirees and almost all of federal retirees have automatic cost of
living adjustments. PENSION FACTS, supra note 18, at 47.
220. However, a unanimous California Supreme Court recently ruled that military
pensions may be divided according to community property principles. In re Marriage of
Milhan, 27 Cal. 3d 765, 613 P.2d 812, 166 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1980).
221. The Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-465, provides that Foreign Ser-
vice wives with ten or more years of marriage are entitled to a pro-rata share of the retire-
ment annuity, subject to the review of the divorce court. Id. Both spouses must sign a
waiver of the survivor's annuity. Id. For legislation to correct'this situation for civil service
wives, see H.R. 2818, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), for military wives, see H.R. 2817, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess., (1979), and for railroad wives, see H.R. 3057, 96th Cong., 1st Seas.
(1979)-all of which failed to pass the 96th Congress. H.R. 2818 and H.R. 2817, would have
required a ten year marriage, after which the divorced wife would have been awarded a pro-
rata share of the credits earned during marriage. H.R. 3057 would have put railroad di-
vorced wives in the same position as under social security.
222. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
223. 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566 P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977).
224. 439 U.S. at 581-90.
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court-ordered marital property divisions, 25 but legislation to over-
turn Hisquierdo with respect to railroad pensions failed to pass.226
Divorced railroad wives are in an especially difficult position.
Under Hisquierdo, a surviving divorced wife is precluded from any
share of the railroad benefits and, as a surviving divorced wife of a
railroad retiree who was also fully insured under social security,
she may not be eligible for social security divorced wife's bene-
fits.221 7 Because railroad retirement does not grant survivor's bene-
fits to a divorced wife, 2 however, she also is ineligible for benefits
from the RR fund. Had she been married to a worker covered by
social security only, she would receive a survivor's benefit, but be-
cause he was covered by social security as well as the pension, she
will receive nothing. The plight of the divorced railroad wife exem-
plifies how decisional law and two major retirement statutes com-
bine to create retirement income problems for one group of older
women.
The Third Leg: Retirement Savings
If nearly nine out of ten women over age sixty-five receive so-
cial security,229 but only one in six living alone receives a pen-
sion,230 the savings leg of the retirement income stool would have
to be very secure for the majority of older women to have an ade-
quate retirement income. Unfortunately, this leg, too, is weak for
most older women. One-half of the women over age sixty-five who
live alone have savings of under $1,000.31
The vehicle Congress enacted to strengthen this component
also may contribute to the income deficiencies older women face
upon retirement. This provision is the Individual Retirement Ac-
count23 2 (IRA), which permits individuals who are not working in
employment covered by a pension plan to make contributions to
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j) (Supp. 11 1979).
226. H.R. 1882, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
227. Survivors of workers covered under both systems can receive only railroad survi-
vor's benefits if the worker was with the railroad at the time of retirement. 42 U.S.C. §
402(1) (1976).
228. 45 U.S.C. § 231a(d)(1)(i) (1976).
229. HEW REPORT, supra note 5, at 183 (Table 16).
230. Id.
231. Pension Rights Center, Pension Facts 2, at 1 (1979).
232. I.R.C. § 408.
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such an account with significant tax advantages.2 "
IRA's and the Retired Homemaker
Homemakers are the largest occupational class excluded from
pension coverage. Only compensated individuals, however, are eli-
gible to establish an IRA.23 Although the Internal Revenue Code
was amended to enable a married couple with one nonearning
spouse to slightly increase their contributions,35 the homemaker
married to a worker covered by a pension plan is not eligible to
establish her own account, even if her husband's pension will never
become vested. Her eligibility is derived entirely from her working
spouse's own eligibility, through employment not covered by a
pension plan.2 86
Legislation to enable homemakers to establish IRA's failed to
pass the 96th Congress.23 7 The proposed laws would have permit-
ted each spouse to contribute to an IRA, based on the income of
the earning spouse. The ineligibility of the earning spouse because
of pension coverage would not have affected the eligibility of the
noncompensated spouse for an IRA.
IRA's and the Retired Working Woman
The four of five women in the paid labor force who are not in
employment covered by a pension, including part-time and sea-
sonal workers, are eligible to establish an IRA. IRA's can partially
compensate for the harm done to women's retirement income be-
cause of part-time work. The IRA is unavailable, however, for the
woman who works under covered employment, but fails to vest be-
cause of mobility.2 38 If IRA's were available to such workers, wo-
233. Contributions to the account are tax deductible when paid, id. § 408(e)(1), and
the income generated by the account is not taxed until distributed after retirement when,
presumably, the retiree is in a lower tax bracket. A maximum annual contribution of 15% of
gross income, or $1500, whichever is less, is permitted. Id. § 408 (a)(1), (b)(2).
234. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1245 "compensation" includes earned income as defined in
IRC § 401(c)(2). Alimony is not mentioned in § 401(c)(2).
235. See I.R.C. § 220(b). The increase was to $1750 per year.
236. Even if her husband is eligible to open an IRA, but chooses not to, the home-
maker will not be eligible to set up her own.
237. See S. 94, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 393, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979);
H.R. 1542, 96th Cong., lst Sess. (1979); H.R. 2914, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3082,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 3171, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 4547, 96th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1979).
238. Attempts to permit mobile workers who do not satisfy vesting requirements to
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men would have a better chance to build the savings leg of the
retirement income stool.23 9
IRA's and the Divorced Older Woman
After a divorce, a woman whose income includes alimony or
spousal support will be handicapped in trying to establish ade-
quate savings for retirement. The amount of the spousal support
cannot be included in gross income for the purpose of calculating
the maximum annual contribution to an IRA,2 40 despite the fact
that for income tax purposes, spousal support is included in gross
income and thereby taxable.241
Conclusion
A sixty-five year old woman who has worked fifteen years in
the home and twenty-five years in the paid labor force has contrib-
uted forty years of productive work. The fact that part was uncom-
pensated, and the rest poorly paid and mobile, does not reduce her
equal need for an adequate retirement income. Whether upon re-
tirement she is married, widowed, or never married, she will be dis-
advantaged under all three prongs of the American retirement in-
come system. The high representation of older women in the ranks
of the elderly poor bears witness to this. Because women constitute
the majority of the older population, solving that generation's pov-
erty problems will not be possible without addressing the retire-
ment income system's* coverage of women.
Retirement income policy planners are becoming increasingly
aware of the problem. The 97th Congress has a unique opportunity
to eliminate the retirement income penalty imposed on women by
establish retirement accounts known as Limited Employee Retirement Accounts (LERA)
failed to pass the 96th Congress. See, e.g., H.R. 628, 96th Cong., 1st Seas. (1979); S. 1428,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). Lobbying organizations for inherently mobile occupations are
strong advocates of such legislation. See, e.g., Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engi-
neers, Inc., Major Pension Inequities, Apr. 30, 1979.
239. Contributions to an IRA yield far more income at retirement than equal contri-
butions to an ordinary savings program. A $100 annual contribution to a regular savings
account would yield a monthly retirement income of $74 for a worker with an average in-
come of $10,000. The same contribution to an IRA would yield the worker $112 per month
in retirement income. INTERIM REPORT, supra note 7, at 20 (Table V).
240. Under 29 U.S.C. § 1245, "compensation" includes earned income as defined in
I.R.C. § 401(c)(2). Alimony is not mentioned in LR.C. § 401(c)(2).
241. I.R.C. § 61(a)(8).
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the nature of their working lives. By restructuring the pension and
retirement savings systems, the three components of retirement in-
come would become more balanced and the excessive reliance on
social security, with its attendant fiscal implications, would be
alleviated.
